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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of the duty of loyalty in Québec
private law. It dispels uncertainty regarding the duty’s nature and
then analyzes the duty of loyalty in the Civil Code of Québec. In doing so, this paper takes into account the mixed origins of the duty by
establishing certain parallels with the common law. Ultimately, this
paper suggests that the duty of loyalty arises when a legal actor has
the power to act within the legal sphere of another.
I. INTRODUCTION
The duty of loyalty in Québec private law was shaped decades
ago by the influence of common law fiduciary duties. 1 These duties
revolve around a central fiduciary duty of loyalty, 2 which is fundamentally a duty of selflessness 3 or in other words, “a duty to look
after another’s interests.” 4 Since the Civil Code of Québec (CCQ)
1. The influence of the common law in this regard was most notable in the
corporate law area. See concerning the historical intertwinement of Québec’s duty
of loyalty with the common law fiduciary duties, Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, Les
personnes morales dans le droit privé du Québec 31 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 1021
(1990); Yves Caron, De l’action réciproque du droit civil et du common law dans
le droit des compagnies de la Province de Québec, 1 STUDIES IN CANADIAN
COMPANY LAW – ÉTUDES SUR LE DROIT CANADIEN DES COMPAGNIES, 102 (Jacob
S. Ziegel ed., Butterworths 1967); Paul Martel, Harmonization of the Canada Business Corporations Act with Québec Civil Law – Revision proposal, 42 REVUE
JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 147 (2007).
2. See Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew, Millet L.J., (1998) Ch 1,
(1996) 4 All ER 698 [cited to All ER] at 18; Lac Minerals Ltd v International
Corona Resources Ltd, La Forest J., (1989) 2 SCR 574, 61 DLR (4th) 14 [Lac
Minerals cited to SCR] at 646; Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring
the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130 LAW Q. REV. 608
(2014) (“[a]lthough they may disagree about many things in relation to fiduciary
obligations, courts and commentators agree that the law of fiduciary obligations
is about ensuring loyalty” at 609).
3. See Lionel Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 141 (Andrew S. Gold, Paul B. Miller eds., Oxford University Press 2014).
4. Andrew Burrows, We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity, 22
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2002). See also Daniel Clarry, The Irreducible Core
of the Trust, 101, n. 475 (2011) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, McGill University
Institute of Comparative Law); Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58
MCGILL L.J. 969, 980, 1020 (2013).
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came into effect in 1994, it has contained a duty of loyalty that is
similar to the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty from which it
derives, though is still distinctively civilian.
The Civil Code of Québec expressly imposes a duty of loyalty
upon certain legal actors: the director of a legal person (such as a
business corporation), the administrator of the property of another,
the employee and the mandatary. 5 More specifically, the Code requires that the director acts “in the interest of the legal person,” 6 that
the administrator of the property of another acts “in the best interest
of the beneficiary or of the object pursued,” 7 and that the mandatary
acts “in the best interests of the mandator.” 8 The codal article that
imposes a duty of loyalty on the employee, does not use this exact
wording, 9 but case law has established that the employee must act
in the best interests of his employer. 10
Surprisingly, despite its codification more than twenty years
ago, the duty of loyalty in Québec has rarely been studied in its own
right. 11 Professor Cantin Cumyn is one of the only authors to have
done so, and this paper owes much to her writings.

5. Articles 322, 1309, 2138 and 2088 CCQ, respectively. Interestingly,
while the word loyauté appears in the French version of articles 322, 1309, 2088
and 2138 CCQ, the word “loyalty” only appears in the English version art. 322
CCQ. Loyauté is translated as “faithfully” in articles 1309, 2088 and 2138 CCQ.
6. Art. 322, § 2 CCQ: “[the director] shall also act with honesty and loyalty
in the interest of the legal person.”
7. Art. 1309, § 2 CCQ: “[the administrator] shall also act honestly and faithfully in the best interest of the beneficiary or of the object pursued.”
8. Art. 2138, § 2 CCQ: “[the mandatary] shall also act honestly and faithfully in the best interests of the mandator, and avoid placing himself in a position
that puts his own interest in conflict with that of his mandator.”
9. Art. 2088, § 1 CCQ provides that “[t]he employee is bound not only to
perform his work with prudence and diligence, but also to act faithfully and honestly and not use any confidential information he obtains in the performance or in
the course of his work.”
10. See e.g. Concentrés scientifiques Bélisle inc c Lyrco Nutrition inc, 2007
QCCA 676 at para 39 [Concentrés scientifiques Bélisle]; Jenner c Helicopter Association of Canada (HAC), 2012 QCCS 3177 at para 147 [Jenner]; Lanctôt c
Romifal inc (Nova PB inc), 2010 QCCS 4755 [Lanctôt]; Pro-quai inc c Tanguay,
2005 QCCA 1217 at para 36 [Pro-quai].
11. Instead, loyalty is frequently subsumed under the general duty of good
faith (see § 1.2).
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The aim of this paper is to draw a portrait of the duty of loyalty
in Québec. In doing so, it takes into account the specificity of Québec private law. Although predominantly civilian, it bears the imprint of both the civil and common law. 12 Therefore, parallels to the
common law are occasionally made, as it remains a valuable source
of inspiration and of comparison.
This paper first elucidates the nature of the duty of loyalty in
Québec (Part I). Namely, it explains how the duty is connected to
the exercise of legal powers. Then, loyalty is analyzed within the
context of the Civil Code (Part II). Ultimately, this paper suggests
that loyalty is a duty that arises when a legal actor has the power to
act within the legal sphere of another. 13
This definition of loyalty is interesting from a civilian as well as
a comparative standpoint. First, from a civilian standpoint, the notion of legal sphere covers the whole scope of exercise of legal powers. Indeed, as it will be explained, legal powers may be exercised
with respect to matters relating to the property of another or relating
to the very person of another, referred to as patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights, respectively. However, unlike the patrimony, a classical but rather narrow conceptualization of the legal sphere, which
belongs exclusively to a person, the notion of a legal sphere is flexible. It may encompass patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights regardless of the distinction between them—a distinction which,
moreover, could be criticized as artificial.

12. Regarding the specificity of Québec private law, see Daniel Jutras, Cartographie de la mixité : La common law et la complétude du droit civil au Québec,
88 CAN. BAR REV. 247 (2009); Sylvio Normand, La culture juridique et l’acculturation du droit : le Québec 1 – Special Issue 1, Legal Culture and Legal Transplants, ISAIDAT L. REV., article 23 (2011), available at http://isaidat.di.unito
.it/index.php/isaidat.
13. Professor Cantin Cumyn has evoked the idea of a sphère juridique or a
“juridical sphere,” which served as inspiration for this article. See MADELEINE
CANTIN CUMYN & MICHELLE CUMYN, L’ADMINISTRATION DU BIEN D’AUTRUI,
TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL 96 (2d ed. Yvon Blais 2014); Madeleine Cantin Cumyn,
The Legal Power, 17 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF PRIVATE LAW 345, 345 (2009).
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Second, from a comparative standpoint, the notion of a legal
sphere 14 is interesting because the ideas of legal power 15 and of patrimony16 are not known to the common law. Free of any civilian
connotation, the notion of a legal sphere is compatible with the common law, which readily recognizes that fiduciaries may deal with
matters relating to property as well as to the physical or moral welfare of a person. 17 The focus of this paper, however, is to provide an
understanding of loyalty in Québec private law.
II. NATURE OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. Inaccurate Bases of the Duty of Loyalty
In order to understand loyalty, it is necessary to grasp its basis.
The duty of loyalty is often believed to rest upon the confidence in
another or upon good faith. However, neither constitutes the true
basis of the duty of loyalty. This section explains why this is so,
thereby laying the groundwork for the analysis of the duty of loyalty
that will follow.
1. Trust
Loyalty has long been—and still is—associated with the confidence one places in another [i.e., “trust”]. To begin with, the term
fiduciary as in “fiduciary duty” derives from the Latin fiducia,
which means “trust.” Moreover, within the Canadian common law,

14. In a common law setting, Professor Lionel Smith talks about a “sphere of
fiduciary management,” which he describes as a “sphere of activity,” and which
should not be mistaken with the legal sphere described in this paper, which is the
representation of a person or of a legal entity (Smith, supra note 3, at 158).
15. As it is understood in civil law, that is in contrast with a subjective right—
a concept that is foreign to the common law. See Geoffrey Samuel,“Le Droit Subjectif” and English Law, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 264 (1987).
16. See Alexandra Popovici, Trusting Patrimonies in TRUST AND
PATRIMONIES 200 (Remus Valsan ed., Edinburgh University Press 2015).
17. Regarding the possibility that fiduciaries deal with matters relating to the
physical or psychological integrity of a person, see e.g. Paul B Miller, A Theory
of Fiduciary Liability 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 276 (2011); Norberg v Wynrib, [1992]
2 SCR 226, 92 DLR (4th) 449.
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key cases have identified trust as an indicium of fiduciary relationships. 18
In Québec private law as well, trust is regularly emphasized as a
foundational aspect of the four relationships to which the Civil Code
of Québec attaches a duty of loyalty. 19 For instance, the Supreme
Court of Canada has affirmed that the mandate “is imbued with the
concept of trust.” 20 Trust also influences the appointment of a director of a legal person, 21 and the selection of an administrator of the
property of another such as the liquidator of a succession or a trustee. 22 Finally, trust has been described as the foundation of employment contracts. 23
18. See especially Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co, [1991] 3 SCR
534, 85 DLR (4th) 129; Hodgkinson v Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377, 117 DLR (4th)
[cited to SCR]; Lac Minerals Ltd. v International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989]
2 SCR 574, 61 DLR (4th) 14, La Forest J., dissenting [Lac Minerals cited to SCR].
19. See e.g. Jean-Guy Belley, L'obligation de loyauté dans les services financiers 3 BULLETIN DE DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE 11 (2012); PIERRE-GABRIEL JOBIN &
NATHALIE VÉZINA, JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN ET PIERRE-GABRIEL JOBIN : LES
OBLIGATIONS, 266, para 161 (7th ed. Yvon Blais 2013); Ginette Leclerc, La bonne
foi dans l’exécution des contrats 37 MCGILL L.J. 1070, 1076 (1992); DIDIER
LLUELLES & BENOÎT MOORE, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS, 1121 para 1980 at 1120,
para 1979 (2d ed., É ditions Thémis 2012); Mario Naccarato & Raymonde Crête,
La confiance : de la réalité à la juridicité in RESPONSIBILITY, FRATERNITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY IN LAW – IN MEMORY OF THE HONOURABLE CHARLES DOHERTY
GONTHIER 647, 659 (Michel Morin et al. eds., LexisNexis Canada 2012) [Naccarato & Crête, Réalité à juridicité].
20. Laflamme v Prudential-Bache Commodities Canada Ltd, 2000 SCC 26,
[2000] 1 SCR 638 at para 28.
21. Very few requirements regarding the nomination of directors are provided by the CCQ and corporate laws, even where very large business corporations are concerned. This allows shareholders to elect a person they deem fit for
the office of director—a person whom they trust. See RAYMONDE CRÊTE &
STÉPHANE ROUSSEAU, DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS PAR ACTIONS, 340, para 741 (3d ed.,
Éditions Thémis 2011). However, although shareholders elect directors, it should
be noted that the beneficiary of the directors’ duty of loyalty is the legal person
(the business corporation)—not the shareholders. See Peoples Dep’t Stores Inc
(Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461 at para 43.
22. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13 (“trust is, certainly, a significant element in the administration of the property of others, namely it generally
inspires the choice of the administrator” at 283, para 299 [translated by author]).
See also Brassard c Brassard, 2009 QCCA 898 at para 106. Trust also has to do
with, inter alia, the prohibition made to the administrator of the property of another to delegate the exercise of a discretionary power (art. 1337, para 1 CCQ).
23. Louise Dubé & Gilles Trudeau, Les manquements du salarié à son obligation d’honnêteté et de loyauté en jurisprudence arbitrale in ÉTUDES EN DROIT
DU TRAVAIL À LA MÉMOIRE DE CLAUDE D’AOUST 51 (Gilles Trudeau, Guylaine
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However, justifying the duty of loyalty on the sole basis of trust
appears problematic. First, providing a clear definition of an openended concept such as trust might prove challenging. 24 Second, although the law can bestow a duty of loyalty upon parties who are in
a relationship, one party may not trust the other. Hence, trust cannot
be the basis of the duty of loyalty—at least not in these cases.
In response to this last argument, however, one could invoke the
interesting distinction drawn by Professor Jean-Guy Belley between
“traditional” trust—the subjective trust a person has in another due
to their relationship of familiarity and intimacy—and “modern”
trust—a rather impersonal trust, required, namely, for institutional
purposes. 25 Trust, if not in its personal, subjective form, would at
least be present in its institutional form in those cases where the law
deems it necessary. 26
Nevertheless, identifying trust as the basis of the duty of loyalty
is inadequate for a fundamental reason: it relies on an element external to private law, rather than explaining private law in its own
terms. 27 Trust is more of a social fact than a juridical notion with
concrete legal implications. 28 It cannot, in and of itself, generate an
obligation or a legal duty. Therefore, while a considerable degree of
Vallée, Diane Veilleux, eds., Yvon Blais 1995) (“l’employé qui trahit cette confiance ébranle les bases mêmes de la relation d’emploi” at 57). See also Bank of
Montreal v Kuet Leong Ng, [1989] 2 SCR 429 [Kuet Leong cited to SCR].
24. In common law, Professor Paul B. Miller rejects the idea of defining fiduciary relationships on the basis of trust (Miller, supra note 4, at 995-999).
Amongst other things, he points out that:
[T]he meaning of trust is contested. Trust may be defined as any of a
number of states of mind, forms of conduct, or both (e.g., a demonstrated
attitude or emotion). In any event, there is no agreement about what trust
comprises . . . . So long as it lacks clear meaning, trust cannot justify
fiduciary duties (id. at 997-998 [footnotes omitted]).
25. Belley, supra note 19, at 15-16.
26. Id. at 15. See also, by Jean-Guy Belley, Théories et pratiques du contrat
relationnel : les obligations de collaboration et d’harmonisation normative in
CONFÉRENCE MEREDITH LECTURES 1998-1999, LA PERTINENCE RENOUVELÉE DU
DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS: BACK TO BASICS/THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS : RETOUR AUX SOURCES 137 (Yvon Blais 2000).
27. See, in common law, ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (Oxford University Press 2012).
28. For an opposite view, see Naccarato & Crête, supra note 19, at 659.
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trust is usually involved in the employment contract, the mandate,
the administration of a legal person, and the administration of the
property of others, it does not follow that trust is the defining element that gives rise to a duty of loyalty.
2. Good Faith
In Québec, it is frequently assumed that the duty of loyalty expressly entrenched in the Civil Code finds its source in the general
duty of good faith that pervades the latter. 29
Good faith is a social standard of conduct that regulates the exercise of civil rights in contractual as well as extracontractual settings. 30 At a minimum, it requires one to act honestly and reasonably31 and to avoid injuring others, 32 but it may also impose positive
duties in certain contractual settings. For instance, the duty of cooperation requires that the parties to a contract actively facilitate the
fulfillment of their common goals as long as this does not unduly
interfere with the pursuit of a party’s own legitimate interests. 33
29. Good faith, being a cardinal and multivalent notion in civil law, is entrenched under various forms in the Civil Code of Québec. According to articles
6, 7 and 1375 CCQ, good faith prohibits the abusive exercise of one’s rights, but
it also governs the conduct of parties at the time of the creation, the performance
and the extinction of an obligation, whether the latter is contractual or extracontractual.
Regarding good faith’s multivalence, see Brigitte Lefebvre, La bonne foi :
notion protéiforme, 26 REVUE DE DROIT DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 321 at
353 (1996); Didier Lluelles, La bonne foi dans l’exécution des contrats et la problématique des sanctions 83:1 CAN. BAR REV. 181, 188 (2004); JEAN PINEAU ET
AL., THÉORIE DES OBLIGATIONS (4th ed., Éditions Thémis 2001) (“la bonne foi est
un concept-phare du droit civil contemporain, aux contours d’autant plus flous
que son domaine est étendu. Il n’est donc pas aisé de la définir d’une façon précise, encore moins d’en expliquer sommairement toutes les subtilités” at 34-35,
para 17.1 [footnote omitted]).
30. PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL LEXICONS - OBLIGATIONS
(2d ed., Yvon Blais, 2003), sub verbo “good faith”, def 1 [Private Law Dictionary
- Obligations].
31. See Bank of Montreal v Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 SCR 554, 93 DLR (4th) 490
[Bail]; Houle v Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 SCR 122, 74 DLR (4th) 577.
32. Art. 7 CCQ.
33. For instance, in a franchise contract, the duty of cooperation requires that
the franchiser provides technical and commercial assistance to his franchisees:
Provigo Distribution Inc. c Supermarché ARG Inc, [1998] RJQ 47, 1997 CanLII
10209 (CA) [Provigo cited to CanLII] at 30-33. See also CHRISTINE LEBRUN, LE
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The duty of loyalty is often seen as a particular type of duty of
good faith in the performance of contracts 34—a duty of good faith
that imposes high standards, much like the duty of cooperation. 35
This is symptomatic of a misunderstanding of the duty of loyalty.
As will be explained, loyalty and good faith are in fact two distinct
duties that impose different requirements for their respective legal
prerogatives.
It should also be noted that there is, in civil law terminology, a
frequent but risky association between “loyalty” and “good faith.”
In Québec, the term “loyalty” is sometimes used to designate the
general duty of good faith that applies in contractual and extracontractual settings, as well as the particular duty of good faith that applies in specific contractual settings. 36 This terminological conflation of loyalty with good faith certainly contributes to the conceptual
confusion. 37
The merging of the duty of loyalty with the duty of good faith is
simply inaccurate. Interpreted in light of the legal power theory that
will be introduced in the next section of this paper, the duty of loyalty is a duty to further interests other than that of the party upon

DEVOIR DE COOPÉRATION DURANT L’EXÉCUTION DU CONTRAT

14, para 34
(LexisNexis Canada 2013).
34. See PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY - OBLIGATIONS, supra note 30, sub verbo
“good faith”, def 1, obs 4° (“The Civil Code establishes duties of loyalty and honesty in different sectors of the law that are in fact illustrations of the general principle of good faith applied to specific situations (e.g. arts. 322, 1309, 2138
C.C.Q.”); BRIGITTE LEFEBVRE, LA BONNE FOI DANS LA FORMATION DU CONTRAT
136 (Yvon Blais, 1998); MAURICE TANCELIN, DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT MIXTE
DU QUÉ BEC 342, para 491 (7th ed., Wilson & Lafleur 2009).
35. MARIE ANNIK GRÉGOIRE, LE RÔLE DE LA BONNE FOI DANS LA FORMATION
ET L’ÉLABORATION DU CONTRAT, 23-24 (Yvon Blais 2003); VINCENT KARIM,
Vol.1, LES OBLIGATIONS 101-102 (3d ed., Wilson & Lafleur 2009).
36. PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY - OBLIGATIONS, supra note 30 (defines good
faith as “[l]oyalty and honesty in the exercise of civil rights”) (sub verbo “good
faith”, def 1 [emphasis added]).
37. See e.g. id., sub verbo “obligation of loyalty”, obs 1° (“[t]he obligation of
loyalty may be express (arts. 322, 1309, 2088, 2138 C.C.Q.) or implied (arts. 6,
7, 1375, 1434 C.C.Q.)”); LEFEBVRE, supra note 34, at 136 (“[a]insi, lorsqu’on
utilise le terme « loyauté » dans le Code, ce n’est pas pour faire opposition entre
cette notion et celle de bonne foi, mais c’est plutôt pour rendre l’idée des exigences particulières que la bonne foi requiert dans ces types de contrats”).
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whom the duty is imposed. Good faith, on the other hand, establishes
an honest and reasonable standard of behaviour, but it is not a duty
to look after a co-party’s interests. 38 In other words, while loyalty is
a duty of selflessness, 39 good faith never imposes such a duty.
In this regard, it is of interest to highlight some of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s teachings in a relatively recent case heard on appeal from the Alberta Court of Appeal, Bhasin v. Hrynew. 40 Albeit
rendered in a common law setting, this judgment is relevant in Québec private law for two important reasons. First, the Court gave the
common law duty of good faith in the performance of contracts a
scope comparable to that of the civil law. Second, the duty of loyalty
in Québec is closely connected to the common law. This means that
the distinction the Court drew between good faith in the performance of contracts and loyalty is bound to have some relevance in
Québec civil law. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada is, after
all, the country’s highest judicial organ, which has impacted the
Québec civil law. 41
In this judgment, the Court overcame the common law traditional reluctance 42 to recognize a notion as extensive as the civilian
good faith in the performance of contracts, while distinguishing it
from loyalty.
Bhasin v. Hrynew opposed a retail dealer, Bhasin, and a company who marketed education savings plans. Bhasin argued that the
38. GRÉGOIRE, supra note 35, at 14-17.
39. Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, Les actes juridiques accomplis dans l’exercice
de pouvoirs in MÉLANGES JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN 243 (Benoît Moore ed., Yvon
Blais 2012) [Cantin Cumyn, L’exercice de pouvoirs] (“[l]e pouvoir, intrinsèquement circonscrit par la finalité en vue de laquelle il est conféré, n’est jamais destiné à servir l’intérêt de celui qui est autorisé à l’exercer” at 246). Concerning the
idea of selflessness in common law fiduciary relationships, see Smith, supra note
3; Smith, , supra note 2, at 608 (“fiduciaries [are] people who are required to
exercise their judgement in an unselfish way”).
40. 2014 SCC 71.
41. Regarding the Supreme Court of Canada’s influence on Québec civil law,
see especially H. Patrick Glenn, La Cour suprême du Canada et la tradition du
droit civil, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 151 (2001); Pierre-Gabriel Jobin, La Cour suprême
et la réforme du Code civil, 79 CAN. BAR REV. 27 (2000).
42. See GEOFFREY SAMUEL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTUAL AND
TORTIOUS OBLIGATIONS 32 (Law Matters Publishing 2005).
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company had displayed dishonest behaviour in exercising the nonrenewal provision contained in the dealership agreement. Namely,
the company had resorted to this provision in order to force the
merging of Bhasin’s business with that of another retail dealer,
Hrynew. As a result, Bhasin lost the value of his business, to the
profit of Hrynew.
The Supreme Court affirmed the existence of a common law
duty of honest performance of contracts. The Court ruled that the
duty of honest performance, which is derived from good faith, is a
“general organizing principle of the common law of contract” 43 and
is immanent in any contractual undertaking. It was cautious in its
scope, stating that the duty did not amount to a fiduciary duty of
loyalty. 44 The Court held that the duty of good faith in the performance of contracts requires that a party “[has] appropriate regard to
the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner,” 45 but
that it “does not engage duties of loyalty to the other contracting
party or a duty to put the interests of the other contracting party
first.” 46 The Court, thus, emphasized that good faith has “strong conceptual differences from the much higher obligations of a fiduciary.” 47
The Court also explained that the duty of good faith in contractual performance is not contrary to the philosophy that underpins the
law of contracts, “which generally places great weight on the freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual self-interest.”48
Indeed, in commerce, parties may intentionally cause loss to one another, and this, as such, is not prohibited by the duty of good faith.49
Requiring that a party performs a contract honestly does not mean
that this party cannot pursue her self-interest in doing so. The Court
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Bhasin v Hrynew, supra note 40, at para 33.
Id. at paras 60, 65, 73, 85.
Id. at para 65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para 70.
Id.
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stated that the duty of good faith in contractual performance simply
is “a reassurance that if the contract does not work out, [both parties]
will have a fair opportunity to protect their interests.” 50
Likewise, in civil law, good faith in the performance of contracts
is not a duty of devotion to the party. Indeed, good faith never requires that a party selflessly furthers the interests of another, even
under the duty of cooperation, its most constraining form. 51
The reason for this is simple. In civil law, good faith governs the
conduct of a person whenever she acts as a titulary of subjective
rights, that is whenever a person acts for herself, on her own behalf
and in her own interests. Good faith, as a mechanism that regulates
the exercise of subjective rights, is thus compatible with the idea of
selfishness, at least to a certain extent. Conversely, as will be shown
further on, the duty of loyalty is precisely a duty of selflessness. This
is due to the fact that loyalty regulates legal powers, which in essence must be exercised in an interest other than that of their holder.
In brief, loyalty is not merely a duty of good faith of greater intensity; it is a duty of a different nature. Good faith and loyalty regulate the exercise of distinct legal prerogatives: subjective rights
(selfish legal prerogatives) and legal powers (selfless ones). 52 The
fact that subjective right constitutes a strong paradigm in civil law—
the civil law naturally envisions legal actors as titularies of subjective rights, not as holders of legal powers—may explain that loyalty
50. Id. at para 86.
51. MARIE ANNIK GRÉGOIRE, LIBERTÉ, RESPONSABILITÉ ET UTILITÉ : LA
BONNE FOI COMME INSTRUMENT DE JUSTICE 187 (Yvon Blais 2010). See also Bail,
supra note 31; Banque Royale du Canada c Dompierre, 2003 CanLII 3102 (Sup
Ct); Caisse populaire Desjardins St-Jean-Baptiste-de-LaSalle c 164375 Canada
inc., 1999 CanLII 13775 (CA); Provigo, supra note 33, at 25-26; 2328-4938 Québec inc c Naturiste JMB inc, [2000] RJQ 2607, 2000 CanLII 19202 (Sup Ct) [cited
at CanLII] (at paras 134-137, concerning the refusal of Québec courts to incorporate the common law “fiduciary obligation” and the demanding requirements it
entails in a franchise contract).
52. Subjective right has been described as an “egoistic prerogative (prérogative égoïste),” whereas legal power has been described as an “altruistic prerogative (prérogative altruiste).” Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at
355, referring to MICHEL STORCK, ESSAI SUR LE MÉCANISME DE LA
REPRÉSENTATION DANS LES ACTES JURIDIQUES 176 (Librairie générale de droit et
de jurisprudence 1982).
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is frequently assimilated to good faith. However, as will be discussed next, legal power is key to understanding the duty of loyalty
in Québec.
B. Legal Power as the Basis of the Duty of Loyalty
Although legal power is a civilian construct, it emerged in Québec in response to the influence of the common law. In fact, when
the Civil Code of Québec introduced a new version of the trust—a
civilian adaptation of the common law trust—a new legal regime
was created to govern the conduct of the trustee: the administration
of the property of others. 53 This regime, which has been described
as an “extremely detailed codification of the common law fiduciary
relationship,” 54 applies to various legal relationships besides that of
trustee-beneficiary. The notion of legal power, as articulated by Professor Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, arose out of the regime of the administration of the property of others. As will be explained, legal
power is now a cornerstone in the analysis of the duty of loyalty.
1. Emergence of Legal Power in Québec
In Québec, the emergence of legal power is tied to the history of
the trust. 55 In 1888, the trust was first formally introduced in the
Civil Code of Lower Canada (CCLC). 56 Although distinct from the

53. See CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13. From a structural perspective, the fact that the title concerning the administration of the property of others
follows the trust in the CCQ’s Book Four on property indicates that the drafters
intended the former to complement the latter.
54. [translated by author, footnotes omitted]: Yves Rossier, Étude comparée
de certains aspects patrimoniaux de la fiducie, 34 MCGILL L.J. 817, at 906 (1989).
55. For a history of the Québec trust, see Popovici, supra note 16, at 201-205.
56. A chapter concerning the trust (articles 981a to 981n) was added to the
CCLC in 1888, a chapter which reproduced the contents of the Act Respecting
Trusts, SQ 1879, c 29. However, even before, the trust had been implicitly incorporated in Québec private law through articles 869 and 964 CCLC, which concerned testamentary gifts subject to a charge and substitution. See Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, L’origine de la fiducie québécoise in MÉ LANGES PRESENTED BY
MCGILL COLLEAGUES TO PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉ PEAU 199 at 200 (Yvon Blais 1997)
[Cantin Cumyn, L’origine de la fiducie].
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common law trust in multiple ways, it was nonetheless directly inspired by the latter. 57 The trust of the Civil Code of Lower Canada,
however, had given rise to conceptual difficulties regarding the nature of the trustee’s prerogative over the trust, which had been described as a sui generis ownership right by the Supreme Court of
Canada. 58
For some Québec jurists, it was difficult to conceive that the
trustee could hold a title over trust property without benefiting from
it. This sui generis ownership right was therefore described as a
“partial derivative” of the common law “notion of dual titles.” 59
The Civil Code of Québec resolved this issue by introducing a
new version of the trust. 60 Under this version, the trustee is no more
than a manager. Indeed, one provision specifically states that the
trustee has no real right in the trust patrimony. 61
More specifically, under the Civil Code of Québec, the trustee is
an administrator of the property of another. 62 Like the common law
regime of fiduciary relationships, which extends the application of
the trustees’ fiduciary duties to other legal actors in relationships
that parallel the trustee-beneficiary relationship, the Civil Code of

57. Sylvio Normand & Jacques Gosselin, La fiducie du Code civil : un sujet
d’affrontement dans la communauté juridique québécoise, 31 LES CAHIERS DE
DROIT 681 at 688 (1990). See also Cantin Cumyn, L’origine de la fiducie, supra
note 56.
58. Royal Trust Co v Tucker, [1982] 1 SCR 250.
59. John E.C. Brierley, The New Québec Law of Trusts: The Adaptation of
Common Law Thought to Civil Law Concepts in DROIT QUÉBÉCOIS ET DROIT
FRANÇAIS : COMMUNAUTÉ, AUTONOMIE, CONCORDANCE 383, 392 (H. Patrick
Glenn ed., Yvon Blais 1993).
60. Art. 1261-1262 CCQ. This trust constitutes an autonomous patrimony,
which is managed by a trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust.
61. Art. 1261 CCQ provides that: “The trust patrimony, consisting of the
property transferred in trust, constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none
of them has any real right.”
62. Art. 1278 CCQ.
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Québec’s regime regarding the administration of the property of others governs the conduct of various legal actors. 63 In fact, it was conceived as a general regime and provides the suppletive law 64 for
when a person manages property that is not their own. Indeed, the
“previously existing rules governing the various institutions involving the management of the property of others, particularly tutorship,
curatorship, liquidation of a succession, trust, mandate, and the administration of legal persons [were] identified . . . [to be] sufficiently
broad to qualify as part of a general law of administration.” 65
Professor Cantin Cumyn, who first articulated the notion of legal
power in Québec, built her theory on the framework provided by the

63. Michelle Cumyn, L’encadrement des conflits d’intérêts par le droit commun québécois in LES CONFLITS D’INTÉRÊTS, 49, 51 (Dalloz 2013) [Cumyn, Les
conflits d’intérêts]. The Code mentions that the following legal actors are also
administrators of the property of others: the tutor (art. 208, 286 CCQ) and the
curator (art. 262, 282 CCQ) of the property of a person, the liquidator of a legal
person (art. 360 CCQ), the State where successors have renounced the succession
or where no successor is known or claims the succession (art. 701 CCQ), the liquidator of a succession (art. 802 CCQ), the manager of undivided property (art.
1029 CCQ), the manager of the syndicate of co-owners (art. 1085 CCQ), the trustee (art. 1278 CCQ), the manager of the business of another (art. 1484 CCQ), the
general partners in a limited partnership (art. 2238 CCQ), the liquidator of an undeclared partnership (art. 2266 CCQ), the creditor of a surrendered property (art.
2768 CCQ), the creditor who has taken possession of a property (articles 2773,
2775 CCQ). See Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, L’administration des biens d’autrui
dans le Code civil du Québec, 3 REVISTA CATALANA DE DRET PRIVET 17 at 24,
para 11 (2004).
64. Art. 1299 CCQ provides that:
Any person who is charged with the administration of property or a patrimony that is not his own assumes the office of administrator of the
property of others. The rules of this Title apply to every administration
unless another form of administration applies under the law or the constituting act, or due to circumstances” [emphasis added].
65. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 353. See CANTIN
CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 49, para 57. Despite the Civil Code Revision
Office’s desire that the administration of the property of others be a suppletive
regime, a régime de droit commun, the Minister of Justice, when commenting on
the CCQ’s title on the Administration of the property of others, seems to have
narrowed its scope as he did not mention that it could be resorted to as a suppletive
regime: see QUÉBEC, CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, VOL.2 REPORT ON THE
QUÉBEC CIVIL CODE: COMMENTARIES, T.1, 372-74 (Éditeur officiel du Québec
1978); 1 COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE : LE CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC
774ff (Publications du Québec, 1993) cited in CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra
note 13, at 49-51.
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regime of the administration of the property of others. As she explains, the trustee, just like other legal actors that are “charged with
the administration of property or a patrimony that is not [their]
own,” 66 clearly has no subjective right over the patrimony he administers; instead, he holds legal powers. 67
2. Description of Legal Power
Following Professor Cantin Cumyn’s theory of legal power, this
notion must be interpreted in contrast with that of subjective rights. 68
While there is no universally accepted definition of subjective
right, 69 it is generally seen as a legal prerogative attached to a subject
of rights (a natural or legal person), which this person exercises, on
her own behalf and interest, over another person or a thing. 70 Subjective rights are found within a person’s patrimony, or the economic representation of a person. 71

66. Art. 1309 CCQ.
67. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13 (“s’agissant ‘d’administrer un
bien ou un patrimoine qui n’est pas le sien’, il est exclu que les prérogatives en
cause correspondent à l’exercice des droits propres de l’administrateur” at 75,
para 89). See also Cantin Cumyn, L’exercice de pouvoirs, supra note 39, at 248
(“[l]’immixtion dans les affaires d’une autre personne est une situation exceptionnelle dont la légalité repose sur l’existence de pouvoirs régulièrement conférés”).
68. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 352; CANTIN CUMYN
& CUMYN, supra note 13, at 80.
69. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL.
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 126 (4th ed., Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1994); HENRI LÉON JEAN MAZEAUD & FRANÇOIS CHABAS, LEÇONS DE
DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT 253 (12th ed., Montchrestien
2000).
70. See PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL LEXICONS – PROPERTY
(Yvon Blais 2012) sub verbo “right” [Private Law Dictionary - Property]. Professors Brierley & Macdonald described subjective rights as “the ‘legal rights’ or
the prerogatives of individuals or groups of individuals that the law recognizes in
relation to others or to things” in QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW 155, para 125 (John E.C. Brierley & Roderick A. Macdonald eds., Emond Montgomery 1993).
71. Indeed, a person acquires subjective rights and incurs obligations through
her patrimony.
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Under the subjective right paradigm, civil law considers that a
legal actor is either exercising his own rights or unlawfully interfering with those of another. 72 Thus, the civil law proceeds upon the
idea that a person acquires rights and incurs obligations for herself,
through her own patrimony.
However, this is not the case where holders of legal powers such
as administrators of the property of others are concerned. For instance, when a curator 73 enters into a contract with a third party on
behalf of a protected person, the curator himself does not acquire a
right against the third party. Rather, this right forms part of the protected person’s patrimony.
Legal power, therefore, is a rather peculiar notion as its exercise
amounts to the lawful interference in the patrimony of another. In
fact, legal power is more than a lawful interference; it is the power
to act within the patrimony of another. When a holder of legal powers exercises his prerogatives, he neither acts on his own behalf, nor
in his personal interests. Indeed, legal power having a substitutive
dimension will be discussed further.
It should also be noted that although the notion of legal power
in Québec emerged from the regime of the administration of the
property of others, legal power may also be exercised upon a person.
In civil law terms, legal power may affect patrimonial as well as
extrapatrimonial rights. 74 Therefore, Professor Cantin Cumyn has
72. This is the idea expressed, although in different terms, by Catherine
Valcke, The Unhappy Marriage of Corrective and Distributive Justice in the New
Civil Code of Quebec, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 539 at 573 (1996): “[e]very human
action is either a legitimate exercise of one’s freedom . . . or else an illegitimate
interference with someone else’s freedom” [footnote omitted].
73. The curator is an administrator of the property of another (art. 282 CCQ).
According to art. 281 CCQ, “[t]he court institutes curatorship to a person of full
age if it is established that the incapacity of that person to care for himself and to
administer his property is total and permanent and that he needs to be represented
in the exercise of his civil rights.”
74. See PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY – PROPERTY, supra note 70, sub verbo
“extrapatrimonial right”:
Right that, because of its close association with the person who enjoys
it, is not part of his or her patrimony . . . . Because they are imagined as
the antithesis of property or patrimonial rights, extrapatrimonial rights

346

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

argued that the regime of the administration of the property of others
could apply, by analogy, when an administrator exercises his powers
with regard to the person of another. 75
The notions of legal power and subjective right can be illustrated
by resorting to the idea of a legal sphere. Where a person acts as a
titulary of subjective rights, she is acting within her own legal
sphere—a sphere within which she is the only sovereign. 76 Holders
of legal powers, however, act within a legal sphere that is not their
own. Where a legal actor acts within the legal sphere of another, he
does not act on his own behalf nor in his personal interests.
The fact that legal powers are exercised in an interest other than
that of their holder implies that the latter cannot exercise these legal
prerogatives for whatever end he wishes to pursue, unlike the titulary of subjective rights. 77 Legal power has therefore been described
as a “prerogative constrained by a purpose.” 78 The potential purposes of the powers are numerous, but they may be grouped into two
categories: the representation of a person and the accomplishment
of another goal. Whereas legal powers of the first type are known as
powers of representation, the powers of the second type are known
as autonomous powers. 79

are often defined as rights that are not susceptible of pecuniary evaluation.
75. Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, De l’administration des biens à la protection
de la personne d’autrui in OBLIGATIONS ET RECOURS CONTRE UN CURATEUR,
TUTEUR OU MANDATAIRE DÉFAILLANT 205 (Yvon Blais 2008) [Cantin Cumyn, De
l’administration]; Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 359-60.
76. The civilian notion of patrimony is a way to conceptualize this legal
sphere that belongs exclusively to a person. Art. 2, para 1 CCQ states that “[e]very
person is the holder of a patrimony”. The legal sphere with which we are concerned, however, encompasses both patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights.
77. The exercise of subjective rights is nonetheless subject to certain constraints, such as the duty of good faith, discussed above.
78. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 355, referring to the
notion of prérogative finalisée put forth by EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LE POUVOIR
EN DROIT PRIVÉ paras 235-239 (Economica 1985). Such a description of legal
power may be contrasted with a “right as an unbounded prerogative [prérogative
laissée au libre arbitre].” Id.
79. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 356.
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3. Loyalty Interpreted in Light of Legal Power
The duty of loyalty requires that the holder of legal powers exercises his powers in absolute accordance with the purpose for
which they were granted to him.80 The protection and the promotion
of the interests of the beneficiary (or beneficiaries) of the duty of
loyalty are subordinated to the holder’s (of legal powers) compliance with the aim of the powers with which he is vested.
A holder of legal powers who uses his powers to further a purpose other than that for which they were granted to him necessarily
breaches his duty of loyalty. This implies that the holder of legal
powers cannot exercise these prerogatives to pursue his own interests. 81 Indeed, as was mentioned above, legal power is necessarily
exercised in an other-regarding purpose.
The meaning of the duty of loyalty is grasped more easily when
distinguished from another notion, the duty to act with prudence and
diligence in the exercise of legal powers. 82
First, while the duty of loyalty is specific and exclusive to legal
power, the duty to act with prudence and diligence can also regulate
the exercise of subjective rights. 83 However, the standard of the reasonable person placed in the same circumstances—the reference in
determining whether one has displayed a prudent and diligent conduct—is necessarily higher for the holder of legal powers than for

80. Id. at 360-61.
81. Conflicts of interests will be discussed in the second part of this paper,
section 3.2.1.
82. Concerning the distinction between loyalty and prudence and diligence,
see Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 362-63; Caroline Pratte,
Essai sur le rapport entre la société par actions et ses dirigeants dans le cadre du
Code civil du Québec, 39 MCGILL L.J. 1, 48-49 (1994).
Note that the director of a legal person, the administrator of a property of another,
the employee and the mandatary are subject to a duty of prudence and diligence
under the CCQ (articles 322, para 1; 1309, para 1; 2088, para 1 and 2138, para 1).
83. For instance, according to art. 2100, para 1 CCQ, the provider of services—a titulary of subjective rights—is bound to act with prudence and diligence.

348

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

the titulary of subjective rights. 84 Indeed, unlike subjective rights,
legal powers must in essence be exercised in an interest other than
that of their holder. 85
Second and more importantly, unlike the duty of loyalty, the
duty of prudence and diligence is not concerned with the purpose of
the powers. Rather, it has to do with the way the holder of legal
powers exercises the prerogatives with which he is vested, rather
than the goal he pursues. 86 The duty of prudence and diligence requires that the legal powers be exercised with care and in a timely
manner, following the standard of the reasonable person placed in
the same circumstances. This implies that the holder of legal power
must always take active steps to protect and promote the interests of
the beneficiary. 87 However, it may happen that a holder of legal
powers does not act in time to protect the interests of the beneficiary
and, thus, acts negligently. Yet, this does not mean that the holder
of legal powers would thereby seek to further another purpose than
that for which he was granted powers. 88 It is therefore possible to be
in breach of the duty of prudence and diligence without being disloyal.
Returning to the duty of loyalty, as mentioned above, it is intrinsically linked to the purpose of the powers. More specifically, Professor Cantin Cumyn explains that a legal actor vested with powers
of representation must exercise his powers in accordance with the
84. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 363. See also Cantin
Cumyn, De l’administration, supra note 75, at 213; CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN,
supra note 13, at 251-52, para 273.
85. For this reason, it has been argued that the “reasonable person” may not
be the appropriate standard to determine whether a holder of legal powers had a
prudent and diligent conduct. While the “reasonable person” evokes the idea of a
rational and prudent person, it does not necessarily evoke the idea of a person who
acts (and therefore cares) for another. See ALEXANDRA POPOVICI, Le bon père de
famille in LES COULEURS DU DROIT 125, 134-38 (Bras Miranda et al eds., Éditions
Thémis 2010).
86. Pratte, supra note 82, at 49 (“l’obligation de diligence et de prudence vise
la mise en œuvre du pouvoir, alors que la loyauté garantit le respect de la finalité
du pouvoir”).
87. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 363.
88. See Pratte, supra note 82, at 48 (referring at fn. 272 to Gaillard, supra
note 78, at para 150).
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purpose of these powers and in the best interest of the person represented, whereas a legal actor vested with autonomous powers must
primarily exercise his powers in the furtherance of the goal for
which he was granted powers. 89 Article 1309 CCQ, which sets out
the duty of loyalty of the administrator of the property of another,
encapsulates the nuance: “[the administrator] shall also act honestly
and faithfully in the best interest of the beneficiary or of the object
pursued.”
In the context of the exercise of autonomous powers, the meaning of loyalty may appear more nebulous. Indeed, autonomous powers may be granted for almost any purpose other than for the representation of a person 90 and this purpose may be rather open-ended—
such as in the administration of a trust patrimony or the liquidation
of a succession. Moreover, it is generally harder to identify the beneficiary in the context of the exercise of autonomous powers than it
is with powers of representation, and the beneficiary (or beneficiaries) is generally more remote. There may even be no beneficiary, for
instance in a trust. 91 However, in certain circumstances, the trust itself could be seen as a beneficiary. 92

89. In Professor Cantin Cumyn’s words: “[t]he person to whom powers of
representation have been attributed must necessarily act in the name and the exclusive interest of the person represented. The person to whom autonomous powers have been attributed exercises them to achieve the goal for which the powers
were granted in the first place” (supra note 13, at 360).
90. Professor Cantin Cumyn writes that “the potential purposes of an autonomous power are many and variable”, whereas “the purpose of a power to represent another is unique and invariable.” (Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra
note 13, at 360).
91. Unlike the common law, Québec civil law admits the possibility that there
be no trust beneficiaries: see Frédéric Zenati-Castaing, L'affectation québécoise,
un malentendu porteur d'avenir. Réflexions de synthèse, 48 REVUE JURIDIQUE
THÉMIS 623, 636 (2014).
92. See Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 362 (“the trust
itself should also be considered a beneficiary of the administration, despite the
fact that it is not a person”). Professor Cantin Cumyn also considers that the trust,
a patrimony by appropriation (art. 1261 CCQ), is a subject of rights, alongside the
person (natural or legal): Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, La fiducie, un nouveau sujet
de droit ? in MÉLANGES ERNEST CAPARROS 129 (Jacques Beaulnes et al. eds.,
Wilson & Lafleur 2002).
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The liquidation of a succession constitutes another illustration of
the remoteness (and multiplicity) of beneficiaries in the context of
the exercise of autonomous powers, 93 as the de cujus, whose will
must be respected, is deceased. It is also possible that there are future
heirs who have yet to be born.
Therefore, as regards autonomous powers, loyalty is best described as a duty to further the purpose for which one was granted
powers, rather than as a duty to act in the best interests of a beneficiary. Nonetheless, where autonomous powers are exercised, there
are persons who benefit from the fulfillment of the powers’ purpose.
In other words, the holder of legal powers who exercises autonomous powers is still acting in the legal sphere of others (e.g., whether
it is the trust, the beneficiaries of a trust or the beneficiaries of the
liquidation of a succession). Generally, such beneficiaries are just
more remote than the beneficiary of a power of representation.
The main requirements that stem from the duty of loyalty will
be discussed in the second part of this paper. 94 For the moment,
however, it is worth underlining that the administration of the property of others constitutes the Civil Code of Québec’s most elaborate
regime in this respect. 95 In addition to the requirements imposed
upon the four legal actors under a duty of loyalty, the administrator
of the property of another is under a duty to account and inform.96
More specifically, the administrator must “allow the beneficiary to
examine the books and vouchers relating to the administration”97

93. For a discussion relating to the identity of the beneficiaries in the liquidation of a succession, see Jacques Beaulnes, Regards croisés sur la saisine du liquidateur successoral in LA LIQUIDATION DES SUCCESSIONS 1 at 38, para 65 (Yvon
Blais 2009).
94. Section 3.2. These requirements are the duty to avoid conflicts of interests, to act with impartiality and not to mingle the property administered.
95. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 57-58.
96. See CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 297-302, paras 316-321,
375-391, 397-414.
97. Art. 1354 CCQ.
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and provide annual accounts that are sufficiently detailed. 98 The administrator must also provide a final account upon termination of his
position. 99
Professor Michelle Cumyn notes that these requirements are imposed specifically on the administrator of the property of another
because the administrator is rarely under the direct supervision of
the beneficiary of the duty of loyalty. 100 Indeed, as explained above,
the beneficiary in the context of the exercise of autonomous powers
is generally remote and may even be non-existent. Moreover, in
cases where the administrator of the property of another is vested
with powers of representation, the represented is either absent or affected by incapacity. 101 This implies that the beneficiary is unable
to effectively supervise the administrator. In such cases, the intervention of a third party, whom the Civil Code refers to as “interested
person,” 102 is often necessary to ensure that the powers are exercised
with loyalty, that is, in conformity with their purpose. 103 The duty
to account and inform thus facilitates surveillance of the administrator by interested persons, who may thereby take action more rapidly
if the administrator breaches his duty of loyalty.
Now that the way in which the duty of loyalty was integrated
into Québec civil law through the theory of legal power has been
explained, it is interesting to return to the common law, from which
the duty originates. As will be shown, a common law understanding
of the nature of loyalty can be surprisingly similar to a civilian one.

98. Articles 1351 and 1352, para 2 CCQ.
99. Art. 1363, para 1 CCQ.
100. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 57-58.
101. Id. at 58 (Professor Cumyn mentions the protection mandate, the management of the business of another, and the curatorship to the property of another).
102. Many provisions of the Civil Code found within the regime of the administration of the property of others allow an “interested person” to take action where
there is no existent beneficiary or where the beneficiary is unable to act: art. 1324,
para 1; 1330, para 2; 1333, para 2; 1352, para 2; 1360, para 2; 1363, para 2 CCQ.
103. This scheme, where a third party must step in to protect the interests of
another, departs from the typical structure of private law: Alexandra Popovici,
Êtres et avoirs. De l’existence de droits sans sujet en droit civil actuel (2015)
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Université Laval).
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4. A Common Law Perspective
A common law theory of fiduciary duties was recently formulated by Professor Paul B. Miller. 104 The parallel between Miller’s
account of fiduciary power and the theory of legal power described
above is striking. In both legal traditions, the legal actors under a
duty of loyalty do not exercise their prerogatives for themselves, on
their own behalf. This stands out as the determining element underlying loyalty. For present purposes, only a glimpse of Miller’s theory is presented.
Miller puts forth the idea that persons in everyday life exercise
means “by which [they] act purposively through law.” 105 For instance, he mentions that a person may “[enter into a] contract, . . .
inherit, . . . establish a trust [or] establish possessory interests in
property.” 106 Those means derive from what Miller calls “capacities” of a person, “capacities that are constitutive of [every person’s]
legal personality.” According to Miller, fiduciary duties arise when
one person exercises the legal capacities (or the means) of another. 107 In exercising the means of another person, fiduciaries act
as the person’s extension. 108 Miller justifies the fiduciary duty of
loyalty precisely on the basis of this substitutive 109 aspect of fiduciary powers; “[g]iven that fiduciary power is a means of the beneficiary, the interaction between fiduciary and beneficiary must be presumptively conducted for the sole advantage of the beneficiary.” 110
Finally, according to Miller, the means that fiduciaries exercise
affect what he calls the “practical interests” of the beneficiary. 111 He
104. Miller, supra note 4.
105. Id. at 1019.
106. Id. at 1019.
107. Id. at 1017: “[f]iduciary powers are legal capacities derived from the legal
personality of other persons, natural or corporate” and at 1021: “[f]iduciary power
is properly understood as a means belonging rightfully to the beneficiary.”
108. Id. at 1020.
109. Id. at 1019 (“[f]iduciary power is substitutive”) and at 1017 (“[i]n wielding [the fiduciary powers], the fiduciary stands in substitution for [the beneficiary]
within the ambit of the power”).
110. Id. at 1020.
111. Id. at 1015.
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explains that these practical interests relate to matters of right, personality, and welfare, which he describes as follows:
Matters of personality include aspects of the personality of
corporate or natural persons who lack legal capacity, including the determination of their ends. Matters of welfare include decisions bearing on the physical and psychological
integrity and well-being of natural persons. Matters of right
include decisions bearing upon the interests of corporate and
natural persons relative to their legal rights, duties, powers,
and liabilities, including those in relation to contract and
property. 112
Numerous parallels with the civil law can be drawn. The practical interests that may be affected by the exercise of fiduciary powers, as identified by Miller, are encompassed in the notions of patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights in the civil law. In other words,
it can be said that the practical interests described by Miller are constitutive of the beneficiary’s legal sphere.
The notions of capacity and legal personality, fundamental to
Miller’s analysis, are also reminiscent of core concepts in the civil
law. Moreover, under Miller’s theory and in civil law, powers may
be understood in relation to legal capacity.
In Québec, one of the first articles in the Civil Code states that
persons possess juridical personality and have enjoyment of their
rights. The capacity to exercise civil rights 113 is a corollary to the
capacity to enjoy such rights, both of which are attributes of a subject of rights. In certain cases, however, the exercise of rights may
be delegated to another, either as a result of a contractual agreement

112. Id. at 1014.
113. Art. 4 CCQ provides that: “Every person is fully able to exercise his civil
rights. In certain cases, the law provides for representation or assistance.”
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or a statutory provision. 114 For instance, minors are, to a certain extent, incapable of exercising their rights. 115 The tutor, therefore, exercises his powers on behalf of the minor to palliate the latter’s incapacity. Thus, although power and capacity should not be conflated
in civil law, capacity cannot be dissociated from a subject of rights
because they are closely connected. Indeed, in civil law, the capacity
of a person to exercise his rights may be substituted with legal powers. 116
This brief overview reveals important commonalities between
civilian and common law understandings of the basis of loyalty. Under a civil law theory of legal powers as well as under Miller’s theory, the prerogatives exercised by a legal actor subject to a duty of
loyalty have a substitutive dimension. Under both accounts, loyalty
is tied to the fact that these prerogatives, whether we call them “legal
powers” or “means,” are not exercised on one’s own behalf, but for
an other-regarding purpose. Additionally, the interests that are susceptible of being affected by the exercise of these prerogatives are
comparable in civil and common law.
C. Conclusion
This first part aimed to invalidate the bases that are often erroneously attributed to loyalty in Québec and to the present true basis
of loyalty in civil law: legal power. Under a theory of legal powers,
loyalty is a duty to act selflessly in the sole furtherance of the purpose of the powers granted to a legal actor. Parallels were drawn
between the civilian notion of legal power and a common law understanding of fiduciary power, parallels which shed light on the fact

114. See art. 4 (2) CCQ above. See also CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note
13, at 69-70, paras 73-76.
115. Art. 153, 155 CCQ. Likewise, legal persons are incapable of exercising
their rights on their own. Therefore, they act through their organs, which are composed of holders of legal powers such as directors (art. 311 CCQ). See CANTIN
CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 69, para 72.
116. Id. at 70, para 76.
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that the prerogatives held by the legal actor under a duty of loyalty
are invariably exercised for an other-regarding purpose.
A simple way to conceptualize the juridical situation of a legal
actor under a duty of loyalty is through the idea of a legal sphere.
This legal sphere represents a person or a legal entity (such as a trust)
on the legal scene.
Traditionally, in civil law, a person is represented through her
patrimony. 117 However, under a duty of loyalty, when legal actors
exercise their legal powers with regard to matters relating to the person as well as to property, the idea of a legal sphere is more adequate. 118 Thus, in civil law, this legal sphere may be seen as encompassing both patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights. In common
law, it encompasses the set of interests that may be affected by the
exercise of fiduciary power.
In Québec private law, a legal actor who acts within the legal
sphere of another exercises legal powers and is therefore held to a
duty of loyalty. Where powers of representation are exercised, the
legal sphere within which the holder of legal powers exercises his
prerogatives is that of the person represented. Because the holder of
legal powers acts in the legal sphere of another, the holder of legal
powers must embrace the other’s interests. As for autonomous powers, since they may be granted for a wide range of purposes and exercised in a variety of situations, the identification of the legal sphere
within which the powers are exercised will depend on the context.

117. Art. 2, para 1 CCQ states that “[e]very person is the holder of a patrimony.” The Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law defines
the patrimony as follows: “Universality of property and debts of which a person
is titulary or that is appropriated to a purpose recognized by law” (PRIVATE LAW
DICTIONARY – PROPERTY, supra note 70, sub verbo “patrimony”). The patrimony
was famously described as an “emanation of legal personality” by CHARLES
AUBRY & CHARLES-FRÉDÉRIC RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 231 (Nicholas Kasirer trans., 4th ed. Marchai et Billard 1873); Nicholas Kasirer, Translating Part of France’s Legal Heritage: Aubry and Rau on the Patrimoine, 38 REVUE
GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 379, 473 (2008).
118. Note however that originally, the concept of patrimony also encompassed
“innate” rights, which are now known as extrapatrimonial rights. Id. at 472.
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This understanding of loyalty is illustrated more concretely in
the next part of this paper. The juridical situation of legal actors subject to the duty of loyalty under the Civil Code of Québec, as well as
the ramifications of this duty in the Civil Code, will be examined.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
In order to get a better picture of loyalty in Québec private law,
is it necessary to examine the landscape of the duty of loyalty in the
Civil Code of Québec. This part of the paper first discusses the juridical situation of the legal actors upon whom a duty of loyalty is
expressly imposed. Then, it highlights the core requirements of the
duty of loyalty. Lastly, it analyzes the restitution of profits, an interesting mechanism that enforces the duty of loyalty.
A. The Juridical Situation of the Legal Actors Under a Duty of
Loyalty
Under the Civil Code of Québec, the four categories of legal actors that are subject to a duty of loyalty involve holders of legal powers—legal actors who act within the legal sphere of another.
The juridical situation of the administrator of the property of another, having been discussed previously, will not be re-examined.
As for the mandatary and the director of a legal person, the fact that
they act within the legal sphere of another is easily conceivable.
Therefore, their situation will be analyzed only briefly. The largest
part of this section will thus be devoted to the employee, whose legal
situation is ambiguous in Québec private law.
1. The Mandatary and the Director of a Legal Person
In Québec, the mandate has always been associated with the idea
of acting for another. Under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, this

2016]

QUÉBEC

357

situation where a person acted for another was usually envisioned
through the paradigm of the mandate. 119
With the entry into force of the Civil Code of Québec, this paradigm shifted from the mandate to the administration of the property
of others. 120 While the mandatary under the previous code could accomplish many acts of administration—much like the actual administrator of the property of another—the mandatary can only perform
acts of representation under the Civil Code of Québec. 121
Typically, in a mandate, the mandator is substituted for the mandatary in the accomplishment of a juridical act, and the rights and
obligations that arise from this juridical act instantly form part of the
mandator’s legal sphere. 122 The Civil Code of Québec also provides
that the mandatary may perform juridical acts that concern the person of the mandator, and more specifically acts that relate to his protection or moral well-being. 123 For instance, the protection mandate

119. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 31, para 36.
120. Id. at 47-48, para 56. Note, however, that for Professor Adrian Popovici,
the mandate was not completely superseded by the administration of the property
of others in this respect (ADRIAN POPOVICI, LA COULEUR DU MANDAT 344 (Éditions Thémis 1995) (“le mandat n’est plus seul; il a un rival ou un adjuvant, l’administration du bien d’autrui”).
121. Contrast art. 2130, para 1 CCQ:
Mandate is a contract by which a person, the mandator, confers upon
another person, the mandatary, the power to represent him in the performance of a juridical act with a third person, and the mandatary, by his
acceptance, binds himself to exercise the power. [emphasis added]
with art. 1701, para 1 CCLC: “Mandate is a contract by which a person, called the
mandator, commits a lawful business to the management of another, called the
mandatary, who by his acceptance obliges himself to perform it.” [emphasis added]
122. POPOVICI, LA COULEUR DU MANDAT, supra note 120, at 18 (“[l]e pouvoir
de représentation explique l’effet essentiel du mandat : le mandant est lié par contrat avec le tiers, de telle sorte que naissent directement dans son patrimoine des
droits et obligations du contrat conclu avec le tiers, avec les recours réciproques
directs contractuels résultant de ce contrat” [footnote omitted, emphasis in the
original]).
123. Art. 2131 CCQ provides that:
The object of the mandate may also be the performance of acts intended
to ensure the personal protection of the mandator, the administration, in
whole or in part, of his patrimony as well as his moral and material wellbeing, should he become incapable of taking care of himself or administering his property.
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requires that the mandator receives all the care required by his state
of health. 124
The Civil Code of Québec establishes a connection between the
mandate and the administration of legal persons such as business
corporations. Indeed, art. 321 CCQ assimilates the director of a legal
person to a mandatary. 125 However, it should be noted that unlike
the mandatary, the director can exercise autonomous powers,
namely when he administers the legal person as a member of the
board of directors. 126 In this case, the powers vested in the directors
are autonomous powers as they are to be used to see to the proper
operation of the business corporation. No representation is involved. 127
That said, regardless of the type of legal power exercised, the
director clearly acts within the legal sphere of another. He is the
means through which the legal person “comes to life.” The legal
person is legally incapable of exercising its own rights and therefore
acts through its organs, such as the board of directors. 128

See also Claude Fabien, Le nouveau droit du mandat in 2 LA RÉFORME DU CODE
CIVIL – OBLIGATIONS, CONTRATS NOMMÉS, TEXTES RÉUNIS PAR LE BARREAU DU
QUÉBEC ET LA CHAMBRE DES NOTAIRES DU QUÉBEC 881 at 889 (Presses de l’Université Laval 1993).
124. MICHEL BEAUCHAMP & CINDY GILBERT, TUTELLE, CURATELLE ET
MANDAT DE PROTECTION 345 (Yvon Blais 2014). However, according to Professor Michelle Cumyn, these mandates may be assimilated to instances of administration of the property of another due to the inability of the represented to supervise adequately the representative (Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63,
at 57-58).
125. Art. 321 CCQ:
A director is considered to be the mandatary of the legal person. He shall,
in the performance of his duties, conform to the obligations imposed on
him by law, the constituting act or the by-laws and he shall act within the
limits of the powers conferred on him.
126. Art. 311 CCQ: “Legal persons act through their organs, such as the board
of directors and the general meeting of the members.”
127. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 358; Pratte, supra
note 82, at 41. However, individually, a director can of course be granted the
power to represent the legal person when he enters into a contract with a third
party, on behalf of the legal person (see id.).
128. Art. 311 CCQ. See Marcel Lizée, De la capacité organique et des responsabilités délictuelle et pénale des personnes morales, 41 MCGILL L.J. 131
(1995).
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2. The Employee
The juridical situation of the employee, on the other hand, is far
more equivocal. In fact, the employee is erroneously perceived as a
titulary of subjective rights—that is as acting in his own legal
sphere.
The conceptual difficulty when an employee is concerned has to
do with the fact that the employment contract is generally seen under
the perspective of the financial benefits it brings to the employee.
Therefore, the employee is perceived as acting in his own interests,
as a titulary of subjective rights. This is unsurprising as it is indeed
difficult to conceptualize that a person is under a duty to act selflessly when she is remunerated for her services.
However, the employee is not the only legal actor subject to a
duty of loyalty who is remunerated. The director, the mandatary, and
the administrators of the property of another are often paid. Lawyers
who accept the mandate 129 to represent clients and trustees are also
usually remunerated. 130 Yet, jurists recognize more willingly that
these legal actors exercise legal powers in the performance of their
functions. This may be due to the fact that the mandate and the administration of the property of another, unlike the employment contract, have a long history of gratuitousness. In this regard, it is interesting to briefly highlight certain historical elements.
The mandate and the administration of the property of another,
as they now exist in Québec civil law, originate from the Roman
mandatum. 131 Under the classical period of Roman law, the Roman
mandatum was performed gratuitously for a friend. 132 A monetary
counterpart for the accomplishment of the mandate would be given
129. More precisely, the contract between a lawyer and his client is of a hybrid
nature. It is both a mandate and a contract for services. See Bérocan inc c Masson,
[1999] RJQ 195 (Sup Ct).
130. Art. 1300 CCQ provides that as a general rule, the administrator of the
property of others is remunerated.
131. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 11, para 9.
132. Id. at 12, para 9; JEAN GAUDEMET, DROIT PRIVÉ ROMAIN 272-73 (2d ed.,
Montchrestien 2000).
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only for the mandates performed for certain “honorable” 133 professions. However, this financial counterpart was not considered to be
a salary, but rather a token of gratitude for the service rendered. 134
Although the importance of the mandate’s gratuitous nature diminished throughout the ages, under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the mandate, which then encompassed some forms of administration of the property of another, 135 was still presumed to be gratuitous. 136 Offices like that of trustee and liquidator of a succession
were also presumed to be gratuitous. 137 The mandate and the administration of the property of others have only recently been detached
from the idea of gratuitousness, and only to a certain extent. 138
However, in regard to the employee, the emphasis placed on the
benefits gained from the employment contract obscures the fact that
he is in reality acting in his employer’s legal sphere. The fact that
the employee’s duty of loyalty is sometimes described as a point of
equilibrium between his personal interests and that of his employer
shows the ambivalence of the jurists when it comes to determining
the nature of the employee’s status. 139 In other words, is the employee a titulary of subjective rights or a holder of legal powers? In

133. Id. at 273.
134. Id. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 413-420 (2d ed., Clarendon Press
1996).
135. The mandate under the Civil Code of Lower Canada did not only encompass instances of representation arising out of a contractual agreement as it does
under the Civil Code of Québec; it encompassed all acts of management. Compare
art. 2130 CCQ with 1710 CCLC.
136. Art. 1702 CCLC.
137. See articles 981g and 910 (2) CCLC. See also CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN,
supra note 13, at 171, para 179.
138. See art. 1300 CCQ (concerning the administration of the property of others) and 2133 CCQ (concerning the mandate). However, following art. 2133
CCQ, the mandate between two natural persons is still presumed to be gratuitous.
139. See e.g. Louise Dubé & Gilles Trudeau, supra note 23, at 54 (“[o]n voit
à quel point l’obligation d’honnêteté et de loyauté intervient à un point de tension
entre les intérêts légitimes, mais divergents, des parties à la relation de travail”);
MORIN ET AL., LE DROIT DE L'EMPLOI AU QUÉ BEC 247 (4th ed., Wilson & Lafleur
2010) (“[l]es parties pourront délimiter l’équilibre que devra respecter le salarié
entre ses intérêts et ceux de l’employeur”).
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the performance of his functions, does he act within his own legal
sphere or that of his employer?
Certainly, when a person decides to enter into an employment
contract, she is acting as a titulary of subjective rights as she is exercising her right to work 140 and is certainly driven by her own personal interests, including the desire to earn a salary. The same is true
of the lawyer who accepts a mandate or the trustee who accepts the
office of trustee. The remuneration offered might have influenced
their undertaking. Nonetheless, in the course of their functions, these
legal actors exercise legal powers and act within the legal sphere of
another.
Likewise, the employee certainly acts within the legal sphere of
another when he performs tasks in the course of his employment
contract. Indeed, the employee has the power to alter the patrimonial
situation of his employer. He may, for instance, conclude contracts
on behalf of his employer. Even the employee who does not perform
juridical acts on behalf of his employer can modify the latter’s patrimonial situation. Namely, because the employee acts within the
legal sphere of his employer, the Civil Code of Québec provides that
the employer is liable for the injuries caused by his employee. 141 In
fact, under the Civil Code, it is in the very nature of the contract of
employment for the employee to act “according to the instructions

140. Id. at 234.
141. Art. 1463 CCQ: “The principal is bound to make reparation for injury
caused by the fault of his agents and servants in the performance of their duties;
nevertheless, he retains his remedies against them.” Originally, art. 1054 CCLC,
from which art. 1463 CCQ derives, was inspired by the master-servant relationship. By holding the master responsible for the acts of his servants, it was expected
that the master would choose his servants wisely. In other words, liability was
imposed upon the master because the actions performed by his servants were a
direct consequence of his choice of servants. Thus, art. 1054 CCLC considered
that some persons, such as servants or employees, were mere executors. The same
premise probably underlies art. 1463 CCQ. On the history of art. 1054 CCLC, see
JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN ET AL., 1 LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE: PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX 809, para 814 (8th ed., Yvon Blais 2014).
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and under the direction or control of another person, the employer.” 142 The employee truly is, to borrow Professor Miller’s
words, acting as an “extension” of his employer.
Thus, the Civil Code of Québec imposes a duty of loyalty upon
all employees, indistinctively, although the intensity of this duty
may vary. 143 Regardless of the functions he performs, the employee
does not act within his own legal sphere, but rather within that of his
employer. Employees therefore exercise legal powers; their interests
are subsumed under that of their employer. As a matter of fact, Québec case law recognizes that employees must act in the best interests
of their employer. 144
In short, the key is to distinguish the circumstances in which a
person acts within her own legal sphere from those where she acts
within the legal sphere of another. Loyalty is not a point of balance
between two sets of interests. Rather, there are discrete spheres: in
one, the person acts as a titulary of subjective rights and is under no
duty of loyalty. In the other, the person vested with legal powers is
subject to a duty of loyalty because she acts in the legal sphere of
another.
It must also be emphasized that the situation in which a legal
actor acts within the legal sphere of another does not amount to a
mere interference with this sphere, “from the outside;” the substitutive dimension of legal power discussed previously must be kept in
mind.
For instance, although the contractor and the provider of services
may affect the legal sphere of another, they do not alter this legal

142. Art. 2085 CCQ.
143. The intensity of the obligation essentially is a doctrinal and jurisprudential construct pertaining to the defences available to a defendant, which are fewer
and narrower in scope as the obligation grows in intensity. On the intensity of the
obligation, see PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉPEAU, L’INTENSITÉ DE L’OBLIGATION
JURIDIQUE, (Yvon Blais 1989).
144. See e.g. Concentrés scientifiques Bélisle, supra note 10, at para 39; Jenner, supra note 10, at para 147; Lanctôt, supra note 10; Pro-quai, supra note 10,
at para 36.
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sphere from within. 145 Indeed, they are not exercising a legal prerogative on behalf of or for the benefit of another under the course
of their functions. They accomplish the tasks in their own name, albeit upon request of their client. To borrow Miller’s words again,
they do no act as “extensions” of the titulary of the legal sphere that
they alter when performing their functions. 146 Therefore, their interest is not completely absorbed into that of the client. This explains
why, unlike the four legal actors upon whom the Civil Code of Québec explicitly imposes a duty of loyalty, other legal actors such as
the contractor and the provider of services are not subject to a duty
of loyalty under Québec private law.
Now that it is established that all four legal actors under a duty
of loyalty act within the legal sphere of another, we will explain the
obligations that flow from the duty of loyalty. These requirements
are ways through which the Civil Code ensures that a legal actor
who acts within another’s legal sphere pursues the sole purpose of
his powers in a selfless manner.
B. Facets of Loyalty
As explained previously, the duty of loyalty requires that the legal actors under this duty act in an other-regarding purpose, more
specifically in the best interest of the person they represent (or of a
goal). This duty has various facets entrenched in the Civil Code of
145. Art. 2098 CCQ describes the contract of enterprise or for services as follows:
A contract of enterprise or for services is a contract by which a person,
the contractor or the provider of services, as the case may be, undertakes
to another person, the client, to carry out physical or intellectual work or
to supply a service, for a price which the client binds himself to pay to
him.
146. See BAUDOUIN ET AL., supra note 141, at 834, para I-867:
L’entrepreneur exécute le travail à ses risques, de la manière dont il l’entend et, en général, avec ses propres instruments. L’article 2099 C.c. précise, en effet, qu’il conserve le libre choix des moyens d’exécution et
qu’aucun lien de subordination n’est créé par la convention . . . . L’entrepreneur reste maître de l’exécution du travail, même si le cocontractant, en raison de son intérêt au succès de l’entreprise, conserve un droit
de surveillance générale.
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Québec. They indicate how legal actors, who are in the atypical juridical situation where they act within the legal sphere of another,
must behave in order to abide by their duty of loyalty. The main
facets, as identified by Professors Cantin Cumyn and Cumyn, are
the prohibition against conflicts of interests, the obligation to act
with impartiality when there is more than one beneficiary, and the
obligation not to mingle the property administered with one’s
own. 147 The facets of the duty of loyalty will be analyzed along those
same lines.
1. Conflicts of Interests
The four legal actors upon whom the Civil Code of Québec imposes a duty of loyalty must not place themselves in a situation of
conflict of interests. Simply put, a situation of conflict of interests is
one in which the legal actor subject to a duty of loyalty could be
tempted to prioritize his personal interest or that of a third party over
that of the beneficiary. 148
Given that legal powers are, in essence, prerogatives that must
be exercised in the interest of a represented or in the furtherance of
a purpose, 149 holders of legal powers must not act in their personal
interest 150 or in any interest that is not related to the accomplishment
of the purpose for which they were granted powers. 151 Put another
way, when acting in the legal sphere of another, a legal actor must
embrace the sole interests of that other. Therefore, a holder of legal
147. Professors Cantin Cumyn & Cumyn also mention the duty to render accounts, which has already been discussed above in section 2.3 (supra note 13, at
284, para 301).
148. FRANCE HÉBERT, L’OBLIGATION DE LOYAUTÉ DU SALARIÉ 50 (Wilson &
Lafleur 1995). Regarding the notion of conflict of interests in Québec private law,
see also Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63.
149. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 360-61.
150. Even when the holder of legal powers himself is a beneficiary of the administration—for instance where the trustee is also a beneficiary of the trust or
where the liquidator of a succession is also an heir—he must not favour his own
interests over that of the other beneficiaries (art. 1310, para 2 CCQ). See CANTIN
CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 285, para 303.
151. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 361.
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powers may not favour any other interest, including his own. Thus,
the rule against conflicts of interests incontestably is the most fundamental facet of loyalty. 152
The prohibition against conflicts of interests is explicitly codified where the director, 153 the mandatary, 154 and the administrator
of the property of another are concerned. 155 The employee’s duty of
loyalty is established in art. 2088 CCQ, 156 but the Civil Code of Québec says little concerning its facets. Nonetheless, the literature and
case law recognize the employee’s duty to avoid conflicts of interests. 157
Not only are conflicts of interests prohibited, but the legal actors
under a duty of loyalty must also declare any interest that could potentially lead to a situation of conflict of interests. 158 The potential
source of conflict of interest being disclosed simplifies the beneficiary’s surveillance of the legal actor subject to a duty of loyalty.

152. Likewise, in common law, Miller states that “[the duty of loyalty] has
minimum core content consisting of the conflict rules” (Miller, supra note 4, at
978).
153. Art. 324, para 1 CCQ: “A director shall avoid placing himself in any situation where his personal interest would be in conflict with his obligations as a
director.”
154. Art. 2138, para 2 CCQ: “[The mandatary] shall avoid placing himself in
a position where his personal interest is in conflict with that of his mandator.”
155. Art. 1310, para 1 CCQ: “No administrator may exercise his powers in his
own interest or that of a third person or place himself in a position where his
personal interest is in conflict with his obligations as administrator.”
156. Art. 2088, para 1 CCQ: “[T]he employee is bound . . . to act faithfully
and honestly and not to use any confidential information he obtains in the performance or in the course of his work.”
157. HÉBERT, supra note 148, at 50 (“[l]’obligation de loyauté défend à l’employé de se placer en situation de conflit d’intérêts, c’est-à-dire dans une situation
qui lui permettrait de faire primer ses intérêts ou ceux d’une tierce partie au détriment des intérêts de son employeur”); MORIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 358. See
also Hasanie c Kaufel Group Ltd, 2002 CanLII 8334 (Sup Ct); Labrecque c Montréal (Ville de), 2009 QCCRT 0283 (available on CanLII); Pierro c Allstate Insurance Company, 2005 QCCA 1165 (available on CanLII).
158. Art. 324, para 2 and 1311 CCQ. The rule is not entrenched in the Civil
Code of Québec where the employee and the mandatary are concerned, but it is
recognized by courts and commentators: see MORIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 358
(concerning the employee); Risi c Fologex Ltée, JE 96-1767 (Sup Ct); 91453 Canada inc c Duquette, JE 91-598 (Sup Ct) (concerning the mandatary).
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The other ramifications of the rule prohibiting conflicts of interests vary depending upon the legal regime. However, they can be
grouped into two major categories: rules prohibiting self-dealing activities and rules prohibiting personal usage of the property or information under the control of the legal actor subject to the duty of
loyalty. Naturally, profits deriving from such personal usage are also
prohibited. 159
The second category of rules is a simple manifestation of the
prohibition of conflicts of interests, where the subject matter is property or information. 160 In other words, a legal actor under a duty of
loyalty must not favour his personal interests by using property or
information from the legal sphere of another to his own ends.
As for the category of rules prohibiting self-dealing, it is interesting to point out that while the administrator of the property of
another and the mandatary cannot, in principle, be parties to a contract which involves the property administered 161 or which relates to
an act the mandatary has agreed to perform, 162 the principle is reversed where the director of a legal person is concerned. Paragraph
one of article 325 CCQ provides that “[the] director may, even in
carrying on his duties, acquire, directly or indirectly, rights in the
property under his administration or enter into contracts with the legal person.” 163 As the late Yves Caron pointed out, this rule, which
may not be conceivable in other settings, is justified by the reality in
which legal persons, such as business corporations, operate—that is,

159. Articles 323, 1314 and 2146, para 1 CCQ. As for the employee, art. 2088,
para 1 CCQ provides that he must not “use any confidential information he obtains
in the performance or in the course of his work.” Otherwise, the legal actors must
return the profits obtained. This will be discussed in section III-C.
160. In common law, this is known as the no-profit rule. Lionel Smith, The
Motive, Not the Deed in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53 (Joshua Getzler ed., LexisNexis 2003) (“[t]he
‘no-profit’ rule requires the fiduciary to avoid making any profit out of the fiduciary relationship, except where expressly authorized by the constitutive act (such
as the deed of trust), or by the court” at 55).
161. Art. 1312, para 1 CCQ.
162. Art. 2147 CCQ.
163. Art. 325, para 1 CCQ.
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typically a competitive environment dominated by the idea of
profit. 164 Moreover, given that directors are often also shareholders,
Caron has argued that it would be counterproductive to prohibit directors from having any interest in the legal person. 165
That being said, it must be emphasized that article 325 CCQ is
not inconsistent with the duty of loyalty. On the contrary, the director’s lawful conclusion of contracts with the legal person and his
acquisition of rights in the property under his administration are conditional to his divulgation of the acquisition or contract. 166 Otherwise, the act may be annulled and the profit remitted to the legal
person. 167
2. Impartiality
A legal actor may be vested with the power to act in a plurality
of legal spheres, concurrently, if there is more than one beneficiary—for instance if a legal actor acts as a mandatary on behalf of
various individuals. In these cases, the duty of loyalty requires that
the legal actor act with impartiality toward each of the beneficiaries.
Professor Cantin Cumyn explains that this rule is similar to, and is
in fact inspired by, the common law even-hand rule, which requires
the fiduciary to act in the best interests of all of the beneficiaries.168

164. “L’abus de pouvoir en droit commercial québécois” (1978) 19 C de D 7
at 12-13:
[M]algré le devoir de loyauté, il n’est pas possible—ni même souhaitable
—d’interdire à l’administrateur tout conflit d’intérêts avec la corporation. Comment prohiber ces conflits dans un système capitaliste où l’esprit de l’entrepreneur doit nécessairement s’associer avec l’idée de profit
et où l’administrateur est souvent un actionnaire (important) de la corporation ?
165. Id.
166. Art. 325, para 2 CCQ.
167. Art. 326 CCQ.
168. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 289, n. 966, referring to
WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 1023-1027 (Mark Gillen & Lionel D.
Smith eds., 4th ed. Carswell 2012).
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In the Civil Code of Québec, this rule is entrenched where the
administrator of the property of another and the mandatary are concerned. 169 The duty to act impartially flows from the fact that each
of the beneficiaries is entitled to the loyalty of the administrator or
mandatary. 170 Therefore, no beneficiary must be prioritized over another. This rule does not set aside the duty to act in the best interest
of the beneficiary (of the duty of loyalty). Rather, through the duty
to act impartially, the interests of the beneficiaries with conflicting
or potentially conflicting interests are safeguarded.
3. Mingling of Property
Another facet of the duty of loyalty specifically concerns the legal actors whose function it is to manage property that is not their
own, such as directors of a legal person, trustees, and, more generally, any administrator of the property of another. 171 This facet of
loyalty requires that a separation be kept at all times between the
property administered and the administrator’s 172 own property. In
other words, a clear distinction between the content of the holder of
legal powers’ and the beneficiary’s respective legal spheres must be
maintained.
According to Professor Cantin Cumyn, the rule against the mingling of property requires that the holder of legal powers take appropriate measures to let third parties know that he is not the owner
of the property. 173 Namely, this facet of loyalty allows the personal
169. Articles 1317 CCQ and 2143, para 1 CCQ.
170. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 289, para 307.
171. Art. 323 CCQ states that the director of a legal person may not “mingle
the property of the legal person with his own property”. Likewise, art. 1313 CCQ
mentions that the administrator of the property of another may not “mingle the
administered property with his own property.”
172. The term “administrator” is used here to designate all legal actors who
manage property, and not simply the administrator of the property of others.
173. Professors Cantin Cumyn & Cumyn mention that these measures may
include the opening of a distinct bank account for the sums of money administered
by the holder of legal powers. With respect to immovable property, the name of
the person who manages a given property in her quality of administrator should
be registered in the Land register of Québec (CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra
note 13, at 292-97, paras 311-15).
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creditors of the holder of legal powers to know that the property they
manage is not their own, meaning they cannot be paid upon it. 174
The rule against the mingling of property is also a way for the
beneficiary and interested parties to keep track of the property administered. An illicit transfer of property from the beneficiary’s legal sphere to that of another (including, of course, the administrator’s own) would indeed be contrary to the duty of loyalty.
The obligation not to mingle the property administered, along
with the prohibition against conflicts of interests, and the obligation
to act with impartiality, presented above, constitute core aspects of
the duty of loyalty entrenched in the Civil Code of Québec. The next
and last part of this paper examines restitution of profits, which can
be seen as yet another requirement that flows from the duty of loyalty, or as a sanction for disloyalty. As will be shown, restitution of
profits corroborates the understanding of loyalty set forth in this paper.
C. Restitution of Profits
In common law, disgorgement of unauthorized profits, through
the constructive trust mechanism, is a classic fiduciary remedy. 175
As a matter of fact, in certain countries, the success or failure of
the transplant of the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty has been

174. Holders of legal powers are not in a debtor-creditor relationship of obligation with respect to the third parties with whom they interact when exercising
their powers. Therefore, art. 2644 CCQ, which mentions that “[t]he property of a
debtor is charged with the performance of his obligations and is the common
pledge of his creditors,” is of no application in such situations. See also id. at 293,
para 312.
175. LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 717-23 (Thomson Carswell
2005). Concerning the constructive trust, see generally Robert Chambers, Constructive Trusts in Canada, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 173 (1999); MALCOM COPE,
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (Law Book Co 1992); A.J. OAKLEY, CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS (3d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1997); Leonard I. Rotman, Deconstructing the
Constructive Trust, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 133 (1999); DONOVAN W.M. WATERS Q.C.,
THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (Tholone Press 1964); GILLEN & SMITH, supra note
168, at 477-564 (chapter 11).
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attributed to the availability of the disgorgement of profits remedy,
which reveals its importance. 176
The constructive trust may be foreign to the civil law, 177 but restitution of profits appears as its functional equivalent in Québec private law. 178 Although this mechanism has yet to be explored, understanding loyalty as a duty that arises where one person acts within
the legal sphere of another helps to understand restitution of profits. 179
1. Description of Restitution of Profits
Under the terms of the Civil Code of Québec, the director of a
legal person, 180 the administrator of the property of another and the
mandatary must return the profits obtained in the performance of

176. Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants:
The Director's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law 51 AM. J. COMP. L.
887, 896 (2003); Rebecca Lee, Fiduciary Duty Without Equity: ‘Fiduciary Duties’ of Directors Under the Revised Company Law of the PRC, 47 VA. J. INT’L
L. 897, 908 (2007) (in a corporate law setting). Disgorgement of unauthorized
profits has been described as a “fiduciary remedy” (id. at 908).
177. This may be because “[c]ivilian systems, as a general rule, are more careful to distinguish property and obligation than is the common law” (BRUCE
WELLING, LIONEL SMITH & LEONARD I. ROTMAN, CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW:
CASES, NOTES & MATERIALS (4th ed., LexisNexis Canada 2010) at 396). Another
possible explanation is that the constructive trust requires the exercise of considerable judiciary discretion, whereas the civil law traditionally implements a structured legal framework which confines the tribunals’ discretionary power within
fairly strict parameters (Aline Grenon, La fiducie in ÉLÉMENTS DE COMMON LAW
CANADIENNE: COMPARAISON AVEC LE DROIT CIVIL QUÉBÉCOIS 187 at 235 (Louise
Bélanger-Hardy & Aline Grenon eds., Thomson Carswell 2008)).
178. See Lefebvre c Filion, 2007 QCCS 5912, [2008] RJQ 145. See also Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 60-62; Didier Lluelles, La bonne foi
dans l’exécution des contrats et la problématique des sanctions 83 CAN. BAR REV.
181, 211-213 (2004).
179. It must be pointed out, however, that restitution of profits under the Civil
Code of Québec does not uniquely sanction breaches of the duty of loyalty. For
instance, the possessor in bad faith must return profits: art. 931, para 2 CCQ.
180. Art. 326, para 1 CCQ provides that the director of a legal person may be
ordered to return the profit or benefit realized if he is involved in an acquisition
or a contract with the legal person and “fails to give information correctly and
immediately [to the legal person]” regarding this acquisition or contract.
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their functions. 181 Although the Code does not offer anything explicit in regard to the employee, the courts have not been reluctant
to order employees to remit their profits. 182
Restitution of profits is one of the sanctions for the breach of the
duty of loyalty. 183 It is sometimes assimilated to a form of non-compensatory damages, along with punitive damages. 184 The non-compensatory damages sanction “faults” that do not necessarily result in
a loss for the “victim.” 185 Punitive damages, as the name suggests,
aim to punish the wrongdoer. As for restitutionary damages, although they may have an incidental punitive aspect, they aim to return to the victim a profit of which he has been deprived, but which
does not necessarily amount to a loss per se. 186
181. The codal provisions that impose restitution upon the mandatary and the
administrator of the property of another go even further: they require that “all that
[is] received in the performance of [their] duties be returned” (art. 1366, para 1
CCQ and 2184, para 1 CCQ) [emphasis added]. For instance, in Lefebvre c Filion,
supra note 178, the Superior Court of Québec ordered a real estate broker who
acted as a mandatary to hand over to his client a building which he bought for
himself rather than for his client, in breach of his duty of loyalty. In this decision,
the Court drew parallels with a famous common law case heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada, Soulos v Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 SCR 217. Thus, in Québec private law, restitution does not only target profits obtained in violation of a duty of
loyalty, but also immovable property such as buildings.
182. In Kuet Leong, supra note 23, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee
can be bound to return profits, regardless of whether he may be assimilated to a
mandatary (at 436). This decision was rendered under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, but it remains relevant today. See also, under the Civil Code of Québec,
LNS Systems Inc c Allard, 2001 CanLII 25020 (Sup Ct), rev’d on other grounds
(sub nom Abbas-Turqui c LNS Systems Inc) 2004 CanLII 26082 (CA).
183. Professor Cumyn has identified four categories of sanctions for the breach
of the duty of loyalty in Québec’s jus commune: specific performance, removal
from office, nullity of the act accomplished without powers, and damages. This
last category of sanctions can be divided into compensatory damages and restitution of profits. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 58-62.
184. Geneviève Viney, La condamnation de l’auteur d’une faute lucrative à
restituer le profit illicite qu’il a retiré de cette faute in MÉLANGES JEAN-LOUIS
BAUDOUIN 949 at 952 (Yvon Blais 2012).
185. Id. A parallel may be drawn between the illicit action and the action which
gives rise to restitution of profits. Both generate liability without being constitutive of a fault per se since the “victims” suffer no loss as a result of these actions:
see MARIÈVE LACROIX, L’ILLICÉITÉ. ESSAI THÉORIQUE ET COMPARATIF EN
MATIÈRE DE RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EXTRACONTRACTUELLE POUR LE FAIT
PERSONNEL 179 (Yvon Blais 2013).

186. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 60; Viney, supra note
184, at 958. The facts of a Supreme Court of Canada case, Kuet Leong, supra note
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It is interesting to point out, however, that it may be questioned
whether the restitution of profits truly is a form of damages or a
sanction. According to Professors Smith and Berryman,
[i]n both common law and Québec civil law, in situations
where one person is managing the property or affairs of another, in a fiduciary capacity, improper gains must be surrendered, although it is arguable that the law ascribes rights
acquired by the manager to the principal as the correct legal
implementation of the parties’ relationship, rather than as a
remedy for wrongdoing. 187
In other words, rather than a sanction for disloyalty, restitution
could be seen as a mechanism that enforces the duty of loyalty
through the rightful allocation of profits in situations where a legal
actor acts within the legal sphere of another. 188 More specifically,
given that holders of legal powers act within the legal sphere of another, it appears logical that they should not keep for themselves,
but rather return to that other legal sphere whatever they have obtained through the exercise of their prerogatives. Under this perspective, restitution of profits may be seen, first and foremost, as a mere
requirement deriving from the duty of loyalty, independent of any
breach. 189

23, provide an example of such a situation; in Kuet Leong, a bank trader made
significant profits through the unauthorized use of a client’s account and as a result of private arrangements he had made with some of the bank’s clients. Although the bank suffered no loss per se as the transactions were in any case illegal,
the Court nonetheless ordered the trader to remit the profits he had thereby realized.
187. Lionel Smith & Jeff Berryman, Disgorgement of profits in Canada in
DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS: GAIN-BASED REMEDIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
281 (Ewoud Hondius & André Janssen eds., Springer 2015) [emphasis added].
188. In common law, although Professor Smith’s “sphere of fiduciary management” is different from the legal sphere described in this paper, he conveys a
similar idea regarding the attribution of profits: “[i]t is not possible, within the
logic of such a relationship, for the fiduciary lawfully to extract wealth from the
sphere of fiduciary management (except as authorized). On the contrary, everything in that sphere is attributed to the beneficiary” (Smith, supra note 3, at 150)
and “as in all fiduciary relationships, the law attributes property and opportunities
arising from the sphere of fiduciary management to the beneficiary” (id. at 158).
189. See Smith & Berryman, supra note 187, at 281, 295.
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To have a better understanding of the relation between restitution of profits and loyalty, we will discuss a case study.
2. Restitution in Relation to Loyalty
Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc., 190 a case heard by the
Québec Court of Appeal, examines the meaning of acting in another’s legal sphere and discusses the difference between restitution
and other sanctions. As will be shown in this case, restitution of
profits was not deemed the appropriate sanction. Nevertheless, this
case is especially instructive as to the relation between the duty of
loyalty and restitution of profits.
In this decision, the Court of Appeal overturned the previous decision of the Superior Court ordering an employee to hand over the
profits he had obtained through the performance of a competitive
activity which, according to the Superior Court, amounted to a
breach of loyalty.
The facts were the following. An employee, named Abbas-Turqui, had concluded a sale on behalf of his own company rather than
for his employer. The sale concerned military equipment similar to
that which the employer sold. Abbas-Turqui had conducted the sale
in breach of a non-competition clause that was part of his employment contract. To arrange the sale, Abbas-Turqui used his employer’s fax, telephone, and computer equipment.
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal first discarded the argument
that there had been misappropriation of a business opportunity. 191
The Court then rightfully held that restitution of profits was not the
appropriate sanction. The Court briefly distinguished the case from
Kuet Leong, 192 a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
190. 2004 CanLII 26082 (CA) [cited to CanLII].
191. The Court held that the contract had been attributed to Abbas-Turqui’s
company because of his personal contacts—or more specifically, those of his partner. Additionally, according to the Court, there was no proof that the employer
would have obtained this particular contract had Abbas-Turqui’s company not
existed (id. at para 14).
192. Supra note 23.
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that introduced the restitution of profits as a sanction for disloyalty
in Québec, even before the current Civil Code entered into force. 193
In Kuet Leong, a trader employed by a bank reaped substantial
profits through the unauthorized use of a client’s account, and as a
result of private arrangements he had made with some of the bank’s
clients. In doing so, the bank trader was acting in his quality194 of
employee, while using funds made available by the bank and with
the complicity of clients he knew due to his employment contract
with the bank. Ultimately, the trader was ordered to remit to the bank
the profits he had gained through his disloyal transactions.
Contrary to the situation in Kuet Leong, in Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc., the employee had not earned personal profits
while using funds made available by his employer, nor had he made
his profits while acting as a representative of his employer. 195 Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, Abbas-Turqui could not be
ordered to return his profits on these bases. The Court thus modified
the quantum of damages to match the injury suffered by the employer instead of the profits earned by Abbas-Turqui. 196 In other
words, restitution of profits was replaced by compensatory damages.
This case shows that the mere use of the property of another is
insufficient to consider that a legal actor is acting within the legal

193. For a critical analysis of Kuet Leong, see Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts,
supra note 63, at 62; Claude Massé, Chronique de droit civil québécois : session
1988-89, SUPREME CT. L. REV. (2d) 325, 335 (1990).
194. In French, the expression ès qualités indicates that a person is not acting
on her own behalf, but in the exercise of her functions. See Office québécois de la
langue française, Banque de dépannage linguistique, online: BDL <http://bdl
.oqlf.gouv.qc.ca/bdl> sub verbo Ès qualité (“[l]a langue juridique a conservé un
emploi bien vivant de ès dans l’expression ès qualités, qui est suivie ou non d’un
complément. Cette expression qualifie une personne qui agit dans le cadre de ses
fonctions, selon les qualités propres à sa fonction, et non à titre personnel”). See
e.g. art. 1344 CCQ.
195. Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc., supra, note 190, at paras 12-13.
That said, the Court of Appeal still implicitly recognized that the employer is entitled to restitution of profits where the employee reaps profits while using the
funds of the employer or when acting as his representative.
196. The Court held that the loss suffered by the employer corresponded to the
value of the services that Abbas-Turqui had devoted to his own business: id. at
para 16.
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sphere of another. Unlike the situation in Kuet Leong, in which the
profits earned by the trader were attributable to his employment contract with the bank, Abbas-Turqui had not been “acting in a representative capacity for the appellant, carrying on its business.” 197 Indeed, although Abbas-Turqui did use his employer’s fax, telephone
and computer, he did not conduct the sale in his quality of employee,
while acting within the legal sphere of his employer. To use the
words of Professor Miller, whose theory was previously outlined,
the employee was not exercising the “means” of his employer. 198
Rather, Abbas-Turqui was acting in his own legal sphere and
thus could not be in breach of a duty of loyalty in this situation.
However, he remained bound to a non-competition agreement. This
raises another distinction, between the duty of loyalty and the notion
of non-competition.
Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc. shows that it is possible
not to breach a duty of loyalty but to breach a non-competition
agreement. As established above, Abbas-Turqui was not acting
within his employer’s legal sphere when he conducted the contentious sale. He therefore could not have been in breach of a duty of
loyalty. He did, however, conclude a contract in the same area of
activity as his employer, which his employment contract prohibited.
Thereby, he breached his non-competition agreement. 199
Such a situation can be explained as follows. While non-competition relates to the duty of loyalty in that it is often imposed on a
legal actor who must respect the duty of loyalty, non-competition is
nonetheless a distinct concept. Non-competition is imposed on a legal actor who acts within his own legal sphere. In other words, it
regulates the exercise of subjective rights as opposed to legal pow-

197. Kuet Leong, supra note 23, at 436.
198. Miller, supra note 4, at 1020.
199. It should be noted however that, unlike the Superior Court, the Court of
Appeal does not mention the non-competition agreement that was signed between
Abbas-Turqui and his employer. Regarding the non-competition agreement, refer
to the Superior Court’s decision, 2001 CanLII 25020 at para 28.
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ers. Although no duty of loyalty attaches to the exercise of subjective rights, it can be modulated by certain legal 200 or contractual limitations such as non-competition agreements.
Compensatory damages are generally appropriate to sanction the
conduct of a legal actor who acts within his own legal sphere, as a
titulary of subjective rights. Indeed, subjective rights are not exercised on behalf of another and the person who exercises her rights
acts in her own legal sphere, within which she is the only sovereign.
Therefore, a titulary of subjective rights is generally bound to compensate another person only to the extent of her wrongful interference in that other person’s legal sphere. This wrongful interference
is measured in terms of loss or injury. Thus, in general, compensatory damages adequately sanction breaches of duties that are attached to the exercise of subjective rights, such as non-competition
agreements. This explains why compensatory damages, rather than
restitution of profits, were appropriate in Abbas-Turqui c Labelle
Marquis Inc. 201
Conversely, holders of legal powers are not sovereign in the
sphere in which they exercise their powers, which have an otherregarding purpose. Therefore, they may not, in principle, 202 appropriate anything that comes from the legal sphere of another. Restitution of profits is thus especially adapted to their situation.
D. Conclusion
This second part of the article provided an examination of loyalty within the context of the Civil Code of Québec. First, it showed
how each legal actor under a duty of loyalty acts within the legal
sphere of another. Even the employee, who clearly benefits from his

200. Such as good faith.
201. Supra note 190, at para 16.
202. There are exceptions to this principle. See, for instance, art. 325, para 1
CCQ, which allows the director of a legal person to “acquire, directly or indirectly,
rights in the property under his administration”. The director must, however, inform the legal person of the acquisition or contract (art. 325, para 2 CCQ).
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employment contract because of the salary he receives, nevertheless
acts within the legal sphere of his employer.
Second, the various requirements deriving from the duty of loyalty were presented. They aim to ensure that the legal actor under a
duty of loyalty does not exercise the prerogative with which he is
vested in his own interest. Two of these requirements, in particular,
illustrate how the Civil Code deals with the dual personality of legal
actors under a duty of loyalty who are, in the course of their functions, acting in the legal sphere of another (as holders of legal powers) and not in their own (as titularies of subjective rights). More
specifically, these legal actors must avoid conflicts of interests and
maintain a separation between their personal legal sphere and that
within which they exercise their powers.
Finally, this article explored restitution of profits, a mechanism
whose relation to loyalty is best understood when one thinks of loyalty as a duty that arises where a legal actor acts within the legal
sphere of another.
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSION
Various elements such as trust and good faith are often thought
to underlie the duty of loyalty entrenched in the Civil Code of Québec. However, the latter’s only accurate juridical basis under Québec private law is the notion of legal power.
The duty of loyalty is inherent to the exercise of legal powers,
which amounts to the power to act within the legal sphere of another.
Where a legal actor acts within the legal sphere of another—as opposed to his own legal sphere—he does not act on his own behalf
and, therefore, he may not act in his personal interests, but in an
interest other than his own. Therein lies the duty of loyalty.
Loyalty is therefore a duty of selflessness. 203 It is more than a
mere duty to take into account the interests of another. It is a duty to
203. Cantin Cumyn, L’exercice de pouvoirs, supra note 39 (“[l]e pouvoir, intrinsèquement circonscrit par la finalité en vue de laquelle il est conféré, n’est
jamais destiné à servir l’intérêt de celui qui est autorisé à l’exercer” at 246). In
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further the sole purpose for which one was granted legal powers. A
legal actor’s furtherance of the purpose of the powers vested in him
ensures the protection and the promotion of the interests of the beneficiary of the duty of loyalty.
Finally, in an interesting closing of the loop, the theory of loyalty
presented in this paper can also be helpful in order to clarify some
aspects of the law of fiduciary obligations, from which Québec’s
duty of loyalty originates. For instance, there is still a fair amount of
uncertainty surrounding the foundations of the constructive trust, a
classic fiduciary remedy. Open-ended elements such as “good conscience,” 204 deterrence, 205 or the absence of “factors which would
render [its] imposition . . . unjust” 206 have been invoked to justify
the imposition of a constructive trust.
However, the understanding of loyalty set forth in this paper
rests upon a sound legal basis. Following this understanding, the
constructive trust could be seen as a fiduciary mechanism that comes
into play where a person appropriates something originating from
the legal sphere of another, while she is vested with the power to act
within that other’s legal sphere. In such a situation, it stands to reason that such a misappropriated thing be returned, in its entirety, to
the legal sphere from which it stems.

common law, see Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, supra note 3; Smith,
Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 2 (“fiduciaries [are] people who are required
to exercise their judgement in an unselfish way” at 608).
204. ROTMAN, supra note 175, at 220-221 (“[t]he majority’s imposition of a
constructive trust in Soulos [is] premised on ‘good conscience’ ”; “[t]he wording
of the majority in Soulos clearly indicates that the . . . primary focus is to remove
the property from the agent rather than to award it to his client” at 220-21, discussing Soulos, supra note 181).
205. ROTMAN, supra note 175, at 719-20. See La Forest J’s majority judgment
in Hodgkinson v Simms, supra note 18, at 208-209. For a criticism of deterrence
as a justification for fiduciary remedies in common law, see Smith, supra note 2,
at 627.
206. Soulos, supra note 181, at 241. This is the fourth of four criteria for the
imposition of a constructive trust, as formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Soulos.

